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modified (GM) and non-GM crops in the European Union
(EU) mainly focuses on preventive measures needed to
keep the adventitious presence of GM material in non-
GM products below established tolerance thresholds, as
well as on issues covering questions of liability and the
duty to redress the incurred economic harm once adven-
titious mixing in non-GM products has occurred. By
contrast, the interplay between the economic incentives
and costs of coexistence has attracted little attention.
The current overemphasis on the technical aspects and
cost of coexistence over its economic incentives might
lead EU policy-makers to adopt too stringent and rigid
regulations on coexistence. Therefore, we argue for
flexible coexistence regulations that explicitly take into
account the economic incentives for coexistence. Our
arguments provide a timely and important framework
for EU policy-makers, who are currently struggling to
implement coherent coexistence regulations in all mem-
ber states.
Introduction
In 2006, global cultivation of genetically modified (GM)
crops exceeded 100 million hectares for the first time. In
the European Union (EU), the only GM crop that is cur-
rently cultivated is Monsanto’s maize event MON810,
which is resistant to the European and Mediterranean
corn borer. Throughout 2006 and 2007, the area planted
with GMmaize almost doubled, reaching the 100 thousand
hectare milestone, spread over six countries (Table 1) [1].
Despite this enthusiasm, GM maize plantings still cover
less than 2% of the total EU maize cultivation area. With
this evolution, the question now arises of whether GM
crops can ‘coexist’ with conventional and organic farming
while still preserving freedom of choice for consumers [2].
Anticipating increasing adoption levels of GM crops in the
European landscape, EU policy-makers are currently
struggling to implement coherent coexistence regulations
in all member states. Regulation 1829/2003 on GM food
and feed, which entered into force in April 2004, provides
the legal basis for coexistence in the EU [3]. According to
Article 43 of the GM food and feed Regulation, member
states are empowered to take appropriate measures toCorresponding author: Demont, M. (m.demont@cgiar.org).
0167-7799/$ – see front matter  2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.tibtech.20avoid the unintentional presence of GM material in other
products. Hence, farmers should maintain their ability to
make a practical choice among conventional, organic and
GM crops without excluding any agricultural options [4].
The maintenance of different agricultural production sys-
tems goes hand in handwith the ability of the food industry
to deliver a high degree of consumer choice. However,
guaranteeing the coexistence of different cropping systems
might be difficult in the agricultural context if no specific
measures are taken. In agriculture, various sources can
lead to the unintentional presence of GM material in non-
GMproducts. Such sources include the following: the use of
impure seed; cross-fertilization due to pollen flow between
neighboring fields; the occurrence of volunteer plants
originating from seeds and/or vegetative plant parts from
previous GM crops; mixing in machinery during sowing,
harvest and/or post-harvest operations; and, to a lesser
extent, cross-fertilization from certain sexually compatible
wild relatives and feral plants [5–10].
Acknowledging the difficulty of keeping transgenes ‘on a
leash’ [11], tolerance thresholds have been established for
the unintentional or technically unavoidable presence of
authorized GMmaterial in non-GM products. In the EU, a
tolerance threshold of 0.9% for food and feed has been
agreed upon [3], although no threshold is officially in place
for seeds to date [12]. At a meeting of the EU agriculture
ministers, held in June 2007, it was decided that the 0.9%
threshold would also apply for organic products, meaning
that an organic product with an adventitious content of GM
material below 0.9% could still be labeled as organic. It is
often argued that there is no scientific justification for
tolerance thresholds. Given that GM agro-food products
are declared safe before marketing, tolerance thresholds
are not related to safety or health issues. Instead, they
reflect a political balance between differently framed
requests and technical capabilities (the lower the
threshold, the larger the error); agro-food and seed bio-
technology companies request high thresholds, whereas
non-governmental organizations and consumers demand
lower ones. When the defined tolerance threshold is
exceeded in the EU, the co-mingled product has to be
labeled as containing a genetically modified organism
(GMO). A lower market price or difficulties in selling
products that contain traces of GM material could induce
a loss of income. This economic damage is expected to be08.03.006 Available online 29 April 2008 353
Table 1. Recent adoption of GM maize in the EU
Member state Adoption
2006 2007
Spain 54 000 ha (15.3%) 75 000 ha (20.5%)
France 5000 ha (0.3%) 21 000 ha (1.4%)
Czech Republic 1300 ha (1.4%) 5000 ha (5.4%)
Portugal 1250 ha (1.2%) 4500 ha (3.9%)
Germany 1000 ha (0.2%) 2700 ha (0.7%)
Slovakia 30 ha (0.0%) 900 ha (0.6%)
Total EU 62 580 ha (0.7%) 109 100 ha (1.2%)
MON810 maize areas are based on calculations of Abbott and Schiermeier [1], and
percentages between brackets represent GM maize shares in total grain maize
plantings (Eurostat Agriculture and Fisheries Data 2008, http://epp.eurostat.ec.
europa.eu) [51].
Opinion Trends in Biotechnology Vol.26 No.7greater in organic farming than in conventional farming,
owing to the generally higher market value of organic
products. Furthermore, organic growers could lose their
organic certification, precluding access to markets for
organic products for several years. In the case of a con-
ventional product, the GMO label might affect its market
acceptability if consumers prefer GM-free products.Within
the scope of coexistence, which extends from agricultural
crop production on the farm up to the first point of sale (i.e.
from the seed to the silo), agricultural commodities pro-
duced on-farm will have to comply with the labeling
requirements at the first point of sale.
In this review, we show that the ongoing debate about
the coexistence of GM and non-GM crops in the EU is
characterized by an overemphasis on technical aspects and
costs, which might lead EU policy-makers to regulate
coexistence too stringently. Instead, we argue for a flexible
approach that explicitly takes into account the economic
incentives for coexistence. We provide a current perspect-
ive on coexistence and explore alternative approaches to
regulate coexistence. Finally, we describe the implications
for policy-makers.
Current perspective on coexistence
Regulations can be categorized into two groups: ex post
regulations are backward-looking, whereas ex ante regu-
lations are forward-looking. When driving a car, for
example, most of us are aware of the ex ante regulatory
speed limits, and some of us might have experienced the ex
post liability consequences of not respecting these ex ante
regulations. Regulating coexistence between different
cropping systems is similar. Since the publication of the
European Commission (EC) guidelines on coexistence [4],
EU member states have established or are developing a
diversity of ex ante regulations and ex post liability
schemes for ensuring the practical coexistence between
GM and non-GM crops [13]. In ex ante coexistence regula-
tions, preventive on-farm measures are prescribed so that
agricultural commodities comply with the established tol-
erance thresholds, whereas ex post liability schemes cover
questions of liability and the duty to redress the incurred
economic harm caused by adventitious mixing. Ten EU
member states have now adopted such ex ante and ex post
regulations [14].
In scientific and regulatory communities, the debate
about coexistence has been centered mainly on the follow-
ing aspects: preventive coexistence measures needed to
keep the adventitious presence of GM material in non-GM354products below established tolerance thresholds [5,
7–10,15–18]; the feasibility and costs of implementing such
measures [16,19–23]; segregation costs and potential
economic losses resulting from adventitiously co-mingled
products [24–26]; who should bear the costs of coexistence
measures [2,14]; and who should redress the incurred
economic losses due to adventitious mixing [13]. Although
these aspects are of fundamental importance when dis-
cussing coexistence strategies, they do not take into
account the economic incentives for coexistence. Economic
incentives for coexistence include either the adoption of
GM technologies as a way to capture ‘GM gains’ or the
cultivation of conventional GM-free crops as a way to
capture ‘GM-free gains’ (Box 1). Until now, very few studies
have acknowledged that the issue of coexistence is only
relevant if there are sustainable economic incentives for
supplying both GM and non-GM crops and for encouraging
conventional and biotechnological agriculture to exist
‘peacefully’ next to each other in the long-run.
Coexistence is an issue only if both economic incentives
‘coexist’ in farming communities; if one incentive is lacking,
strictly speaking there is no coexistence problem. Some
farmers might adopt GM crops – and thus be prepared to
invest in coexistence measures – if the benefits of planting
GM crops (i.e. the GM gains) exceed the costs of imple-
mented measures. Other farmers might gain more from
preserving the GM-free status of their production. In any
system of identity preservation (e.g. in the seed or organic
sector), farmers aiming at preserving a specific product
quality are responsible for undertaking the respective
measures. By contrast, EU farmers cultivating non-GM
crops have no legal obligation to undertake coexistence
measures; instead, these are currently the responsibility of
the GM farmer. However, farmers cultivating non-GM
crops might have incentives to apply coexistence measures
if they hope to receive a sufficient price premium for GM-
free crops. By applying coexistence measures, they will
avoid adventitious mixing, in turn ensuring a GM-free
production. Given that the potential gains due to the
cultivation of GM crops are lost when a farmer switches
from GM to GM-free crops, GM-free gains must compen-
sate lost GM gains.
In the EU, owing to the limited adoption of GM crops
(Table 1), no economically important coexistence issues
have been reported to date – even in Spain, the largest
adopter of GM maize. In Canada, by contrast, owing to
stringent organic standards (i.e. zero tolerance for GM
content), organic farmers claim that the presence of GM
canola varieties, and the occurrence of cross-fertilizations,
makes it impossible for them to have their organically
produced canola certified as organic [19].
Regulating spatial coexistence: rigid versus flexible
regulations
The challenge for farmers is to keep the adventitious pre-
sence of GMmaterial in non-GM products below the estab-
lished tolerance thresholds, which ultimately involves
minimizing cross-fertilization between neighboring fields.
At present, two ex ante coexistence regulations have been
proposed for this purpose: isolation distances and pollen
barriers (Box 2) [13]. Given that pollen concentrations
Box 1. Economic incentives for coexistence: GM gains
versus GM-free gains
The economic benefits of GM crops (i.e. ‘GM gains’) include the
following: increases in productivity and efficacy; production cost
reductions; and non-pecuniary benefits, such as increases in
management flexibility [36,40,48,49]. If there is a substantial
demand for non-GM crops, this will be reflected by a price difference
between GM and non-GM crops. In other words, non-GM crops will
yield a price premium on the market, relative to GM crops [25,26].
GM-free crops are non-GM crops that are intended to be free of GM
material, although they might contain an adventitious GMO content
up to 0.9% in the EU [3]. At GMO contents above the threshold, non-
GM crops do not acquire the unlabeled ‘GM-free’ status and have to
be labeled and commercialized as ‘containing a GMO’ at the same
price level as GM crops (i.e. without yielding any price premium on
the crop market). When the purity threshold is met, ‘GM-free gains’
represent the total additional income generated through capturing
price premiums for GM-free crops. As a comparison, in the USA,
labeling of GM products is not mandatory, but voluntary GM-free
labeling can be applied up to a threshold of 5% of GMO content [50].
GM-free price premiums differ from organic price premiums;
products can only be labeled ‘certified organic’ if all procedures
occurring along the supply chain (from crop production to proces-
sing) have been verified to comply with established organic
standards [19]. One of the standards is the GM-free status, for
which similar thresholds are applied (e.g. 0.9% threshold in the EU
[13], 5% in the US (United States Department of Agriculture, ‘The
National Organic Program: Program Standards’, http://www.am-
s.usda.gov/nop/NOP/standards.html) and 0% in Canada [19]).
Hence, organic crops are GM-free but GM-free crops are not
necessarily organic. However, US experience shows that, in
practice, most GM-free products at the retail level are organic
products [50].
Box 2. Rigid versus flexible coexistence regulations:
isolation distances versus pollen barriers
Isolation distances are rules governing the minimum distance
between GM and non-GM crop fields of the same species. If a
farmer’s field is too close to a neighboring farmer’s non-GM field of
a particular crop, the field has to be planted with other crops or the
same crop species but with non-GM varieties. Pollen barriers are
coexistence measures that rely on field margins that are planted
with non-GM crops of the same species and which will need to be
labeled as GMO-containing. Pollen barriers serve as cross-fertiliza-
tion zones between GM and non-GM varieties of the same crops and
can be planted on donor or recipient fields; the specifics of the
barriers can be negotiated between neighboring farmers. Imposing
measures on GM crop farmers – considering that GM crop
production is the ‘newcomer’ in European countries [4] – introduces
rigidity in coexistence regulations, whereas leaving measures open
for negotiation between farmers introduces flexibility. Hence, in our
definition, pollen barriers are better-suited measures than isolation
distances for building flexibility into coexistence regulations.
Opinion Trends in Biotechnology Vol.26 No.7rapidly decrease with increasing distance from the pollen
source, spatially isolating fields of GM crops from non-GM
ones is a robust strategy to reduce the extent of cross-
fertilization. Based on the scientific literature on pollen
dispersal and cross-fertilization and on predictive vertical
gene flow modeling at the landscape level, it is generally
suggested that isolation distances ranging from 10 to 50 m
would be sufficient to keep the adventitious presence of GM
material from cross-fertilizations below the tolerance
threshold of 0.9% in the harvest of neighboring non-GM
maize fields. The necessary isolation distance within the
determined range will be influenced by the seed purity of
non-GM maize, field characteristics and distribution, (GM)
maize share, crop type, differences in sowing and flowering
times and by meteorological conditions [5,9,10,16,18]. In a
similar manner, plants sown around the source or recipient
field can function as a pollen barrier and effectively reduce
the extent of out-crossing between neighboring fields. First,
by separating the inner parts of neighboring fields, pollen
barriers act as an isolation distance, in turn increasing the
distance GM pollen has to travel for cross-fertilization.
Second, a pollen barrier – if the GM and non-GM crops in
question are the same species – introduces competing pollen
and/or can serve as a physical barrier to the flow of air and,
consequently, the flow of pollen [16,27–31]. Accordingly, a
pollen barrier reduces the extent of cross-fertilizationmuch
more effectively than an isolation perimeter of bare ground
of the same width [32,33].
A recent case-study focusing on the interaction between
the incentives and the costs of coexistence suggests that
the costs of complying with rigid regulations, such asexcessive isolation distance requirements, are not
proportional to the economic incentives of coexistence
(i.e. GM versus GM-free gains) (Box 1) [34]. First, if con-
sumers are not willing to pay significant price premiums
for GM-free crops, isolation distances generate substantial
losses for GM crop producers, who are denied GM gains
from growing GM crops while hardly capturing any com-
pensatory GM-free gains. The net loss (i.e. GM gainsminus
GM-free gains) is in no way proportional to the weak
incentives for supplying GM-free crops. By contrast, if
consumers are willing to pay substantial price premiums
for GM-free crops, farmers who are denied GM gains will
attempt to compensate these losses by planting non-GM
crops while avoiding any adventitious mixing from GM
crops and aiming to capture GM-free gains. In doing so,
they risk triggering a domino effect at the landscape level
by forcing other farmers to follow their example, illustrated
in Figure 1 (see also Box 3).
By contrast, flexible measures such as pollen barriers
(Box 2) should be negotiable amongst GM and non-GM
farmers, because both have economic incentives to ensure
coexistence in the long run. Theoretically, pollen barriers
can be planted and cultivated by the GM farmer or the non-
GM neighboring farmer. In the GM farmer’s case, the area
planted with the non-GM pollen barrier does not benefit
from any GM gains and, hence, the cost of the pollen
barrier is equal – and therefore proportional – to the lost
GM-gains. In the non-GM farmer’s case, the area planted
with the non-GM pollen barrier is harvested separately,
sold as ‘GM’ and, hence, does not benefit from any GM-free
gains. In this case, the cost of the pollen barrier is equal –
and therefore proportional – to the lost GM-free gains. This
cost is borne by the non-GM farmer and can be reimbursed
by the GM farmer through a compensatory payment. Con-
sequently, by design these measures are proportional to
the GM and GM-free gains (i.e. the economic incentives for
coexistence; Box 1) and, hence, less counterproductive for
European agriculture [34]. Furthermore, additional non-
random actions, such as the voluntary clustering of fields
among different farms, would further reduce the costs of
flexible coexistence measures, despite the organizational
costs involved in coordinating farmers’ planting intentions.
This was already recognized in the EC guidelines on355
Figure 1. Illustration of the domino effect due to rigid coexistence regulations. The
panels represent three different phases in the joint decision process of neighboring
Opinion Trends in Biotechnology Vol.26 No.7
356coexistence [4]. Therefore, as farmers are inclined to take
decisions that minimize transaction costs, in the long run
we expect clustering to precede any implementation of
costly coexistence measures.
Implications for EU policy-makers
According to a recent Communication from the EC to the
Council and the European Parliament, ‘[. . .]coexistence
measures should not go beyondwhat is necessary to ensure
that adventitious traces of GMOs stay below the labeling
threshold[. . .]to avoid any unnecessary burden for the
operators concerned. While some member states have
taken this advice into account, others have decided to
propose or adopt measures that aim to reduce adventitious
presence of GMOs below this level. In some cases, proposed
measures, such as isolation distances between GM and
non-GM fields, appear to entail greater efforts for GM crop
growers than necessary, which raises questions about the
proportionality of certain measures.[. . .]While the [EC]
recognizes the legitimate right to regulate the cultivation
of GM crops to achieve coexistence, it stresses that any
approach needs to be proportionate to the aim of achieving
coexistence.’ [13].
We argue that rigid coexistence regulations, such as
large isolation distances, violate the proportionality con-
dition and jeopardize the ability of some farmers to adopt
GM crops and reduce their production costs. More alar-
mingly, the implementation of rigid rules could be misused
by opponents of GM crops to create and extend GMO-free
zones, even when the demand for GM-free crops is limited.
We concur with Jank et al. [2] that GMO-free zones can be
established as measures for coexistence, provided that
they are proportional and temporal. Furthermore, the
decision not to grow transgenic crops in a specific region
should be taken in conjunction with the farmers and on a
voluntary basis. However, we would like to emphasize that
the existence of a sustainable demand for GM-free crops is
a precondition to justify these extremely rigid and costly
coexistence measures. This is important for policy-makers,
because the debate about coexistence has been too often
centered on technical aspects and costs instead of incen-
tives. In September 2007, the European Court of Justice
finally rejected general statutory regional bans of GMOs
(e.g. in the case of Upper Austria), given that a statutory
ban is a denial of the freedom of choice for farmers and
consumers (http://www.europabio.org/articles/PR-Austria-
n_ECJ_070914.pdf).
We contend that flexible measures respect the propor-
tionality condition and are also better adapted to the
natural heterogeneity of GM gains and homogeneity offarmers to grow GM or non-GM varieties of a crop in a hypothetical landscape. The
crop in question, represented by the colored fields, is assumed to be part of a four-
year rotation cycle and is planted on a quarter of the total arable area. Half of this
quarter is planted with a GM variety (brown fields) and the other half of the quarter
is planted with a non-GM variety (yellow fields). (a) The depicted cropping pattern
results from unconstrained, random planting decisions of farmers. (b) By
complying with certain rigid isolation distances, some GM farmers need to
convert their planting decisions to non-GM. This leads to a progressive reduction
of GM crop plantings in the landscape. (c) The changed planting decisions create
additional distance conflicts, thereby further removing GM crops from the
landscape until all distance requirements are met and only small clusters of GM
crop plantings remain.
Box 3. Domino effect
The domino effect is the theoretical spillover effect of farmer
decisions in a GM-free crops-favorable market. It is induced by
enforcing rigid coexistence regulations on potential GM crop
adopters. In the absence of any regulation, GM and GM-free
planting options would coexist in a population of farmers. Through
compliance with isolation distances, some potential GM crop
adopters will have to modify their planting decisions (i.e. from GM
to non-GM varieties) and will attempt to capture GM-free gains by
complying with GM-free standards. These new GM-free farmers
might, in turn, restrict planting options and convert planting
decisions of neighboring GM farmers. Subsequently, this might
affect other GM farmers’ planting options and impinge on planting
decisions, etc., until all distance requirements between GM and non-
GM fields are met at the landscape level. The domino effect
constrains potential adoption rates and raises the costs and the
non-proportional character of rigid coexistence regulations. Its
radius of action and intensity is essentially a function of the
following factors: the degree of land fragmentation; the planting
density and rotation cycle of the crop in the landscape; the legally
enforced isolation distance; and the price premium consumers are
willing to pay for GM-free crops. Contrary to common sense of
intuition, the domino effect is not a direct function of the crop and
the trait; it only depends on the biological properties of the crop and
the trait insofar as these biological properties provide scientific
evidence on crop-specific gene flow, which influences regulatory
decisions on isolation distances [34].
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geneous conditions with respect to land quality, pest pres-
sure, managerial expertise, education and market access,
the gains they capture from adopting GM cropsmight vary.
GM-free price premiums, by contrast, apply to all farmers,
because they are generated by the interaction of aggregate
demand and supply (i.e. market share) on the market for
non-GM crops. As long as consumers are willing to pay
significant GM-free price premiums, highly productive
areas, in which the incentive for growing GM crops is
higher than the incentive for supplying GM-free crops,
will cluster as GM regions, whereas low productive areas
will rapidly form GMO-free zones [19,35] in an attempt to
capture the GM-free gains.
Profits from growing GM crops, although hetero-
geneous, have been more or less established after a decade
of global GM crop adoption [36], whereas future GM-free
price premium levels are still uncertain in the EU, owing to
limited experience with the large-scale diffusion of GM
crops (Table 1). Therefore, Europe’s trade-off between
planting GM crops and supplying GM-free crops will large-
ly depend on the market signals stemming from consumer
demand for GM-free products. This does not imply that,
under weak market-signals for GM-free crops, the entire
European landscape will be planted with GM crops.
Experience has shown that GM crop adoption is usually
incomplete, owing to several reasons. First, proprietary
GM seed technologies are protected by intellectual prop-
erty rights (i.e. patents) that confer monopoly rights to the
discoverer – with some limitations. As a result, GM seed
prices are higher than they would be in a perfectly com-
petitive market, despite competition from chemical altern-
atives [37–39]. If biotechnology companies set the GM seed
price at a uniform, monopolistic level among a hetero-
geneous group of farmers, some farmers would find it
profitable to adopt the innovation, while others wouldnot [39–41]. Other reasons for incomplete adoption include
farmers’ uncertainty about anticipated GM gains [42], and
risk aversion towards new technologies, a well-known
phenomenon in the literature on agricultural innovation
[43,44].
To date, price differentials for GM-free crops have been
weak in international agricultural markets [45,46]. How-
ever, this might change if availability (i.e. market share) of
GM-free products declines as a result of worldwide adop-
tion of GM crops. Only if consumers have strong and
sustainable preferences for non-GM crops, and only if they
are willing to pay significant price premiums for them will
some farmers have an incentive to supply GM-free crops. If
the opposite holds, strictly speaking there is no coexistence
issue and coexistence costs will purely reflect the costs of
compliance to EU coexistence laws instead of the economic
incentives for coexistence.
Authorities might be reluctant to adopt flexible ex ante
regulations, but in the absence of clear market-signals for
GM-free crops, regulatory rigidity should be shifted from ex
ante to ex post to avoid jeopardizing the economic incen-
tives for coexistence and competitiveness of EU agricul-
ture. Going back to our car example, our proposed model of
regulation would be somewhat comparable to German
traffic laws, wherein both enforced (rigid) and suggested
(flexible) ex ante speed limits exist on highways. However,
in case of a road accident, the driver can be held (ex post)
liable for negligence if he did not comply with the ex ante
speed limit during the accident [47]. Similarly, in their
coexistence regulations, Germany is planning to introduce
flexibility, which is currently highly debated among
politicians and interest groups (http://www.agrizert.de/
uploads/media/Eckpunktepapier-Gentechnik.pdf).
Conclusion
Rigid coexistence regulations are not proportional to the
economic incentives for coexistence, especially in the
absence of strong market-signals for GM-free crops.
Instead, we argue that flexible measures respect the pro-
portionality condition, are less counterproductive for Euro-
pean agriculture and, hence, are more consistent with the
objectives of the EC. Therefore, we recommend flexible ex
ante coexistence regulations, complemented by rigid and
clearly defined ex post liability rules. Our arguments pro-
vide a timely framework for EU policy-makers, who cur-
rently face the challenge of implementing coherent
coexistence regulations for the heterogeneous landscape
of European agriculture.References
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